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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

~RLIEAN VICKERS BARRETT and

GEORGE C. BARRETT,

Plaintifjs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
9410

LELAND H. VICKERS, et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from the Judgment and
Dfcree of the Honorable John L. Sevy Jr., District Judge
rii the Sixth Judicial District in and for Juab County, Utah,
made and entered on the 21st day of December, 1960, and,
from his Order made and entered on the 31st day of December,
1
960, overruling plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial.

3

The case involves an action filed in the Dist · C
rict oun .
Juab County on September 23, 1942, for the pur ose
.'
.. .
. f
P of f,1
tthonmg certam arm and ranch property or ha · .
·
. .

Vll1g 1t SL:

.

and then d1v1dmg the proceeds among the parties aft
er accuur
ing for various claims asserted between them.
·
The particular land is located in Juab County, Utah ..~,,
was purchased from the State of Utah pursuant to th t tern

of a contract dated July 21, 1938, between the State of lrii
and, plaintiffs and respondents herein, Arliean Vickers Barrt'
and George C. Barrett. (Defendants' Exhibit 1). It is 10 ,

noted, however, in a prior action between the same pamt-

the Honorable Will L. Hoyt, District Judge, ruled on Augci
15, 1940, in view of all surrounding circumstances, and, SUDitJ
to the terms of said contract, that Arliean Vickers Barrett an;
George C. Barrett, were owners of an undivided one-rnurt:,
interest, that Leland H. Vickers was the owner of an undmde:
one-fourth interest, that Sterling D. Vickers and Ethe'1:
Vickers were the owners of an undivided one-fourth in'.Cie>i.
and, that Joseph S. Barrett and Ethel V. Barrett were tn:
owners of an undivided one-fourth interest. (Defendznt;
Exhibit 2).

In that action Judge Hoyt ruled also that

'..1

defendants were to assume with plaintiffs all of the obli&at101
enjoined upon plaintiffs for the purchase of the said ii

1

11

:

pursuant to the terms of the contract with the State ot lt.
This they did by written agreement, copy of which is incudtc
1

in and made a part of the record in this case. (R. 17) fudr'.
Hoyt's ruling, as aforesaid, in that prior action, was " ' 1T '·
by this Court on September 10, 1941, in the case
0JW

o:

et al v. Vickers et al., 100 Utah 534, 116 P2d 772.
The case here for review came on for trial before :h

4

L Sevy Jr. rn 1946. Prior to the trial Judge
rt,. 1. 111 ul''D1t
. . . i J\>1111
~

:)ci' h3 J ;1ppo111ted three appraisers for the express purpose

having them decermine if the land could be partitioned.

d

Tlie duh Jppointed appraisers rendered a majority and

a

:rin~rit·1 report. The majority report dated July 23, 1944, he!<l
t!l

iwt th;;t "the property in question cannot be partitioned

,· ithout great pre1udice to the parties concerned"

(R. 29). The

iri1riority report, dated September 15, 1944, held in part that:
\\'bile I belie\'e it 1s better in one unit, yet as I see the case
this ground was properly surveyed in assessed valuation on

ii

portion thereof 1t can and should be divided to make

ucll

tqua; rights for all concerned" (R. 28).
After taking the matter under advisement, Judge Sevy
:~1aJe

a written Decision in the matter dated April 15, 1947,

(P. "2· 34) m which, among other things, he ruled as follows:

" * * * said land is so situated that partition thereof
cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners;
that u 1a!e thereof in bulk and as a whole is for the

.;12terests of all concerned and the court concludes
that eltha one or three referees should be appointed,
p:efcrahiy rme, as by statute provided, who should
fr0.nd ti; v1di,ertise and sell the property in bulk and
,:IJ a uho!e to the hi[!,hest cash bidder in the manner
/lrnl'ided hv rtat11te and make return and report of said
Ja!e a12d petition for confirmation thereof * * * ."
(Emphasis supplied).

\'?bile proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
''.~ether with a proposed Judgment and Decree based on Judge
Seyy's \\ritten Decision of April 15, 1947, were submitted,
1

11

'"

~ er s1p:ned them, possibly because numerous objections

11 1

" er~ rr.ad<:>, In the intervening thirteen and one-half (l3V2)
1

5

years between his written Decision of April 15
, 1947 an
December 21, 1960, the date of the Judgment and ' ''
which he did sign, and, which is here for review J d Dec'r'·
.
.
' u ge Se1"
held numerous hearings m an effort to resolve th ,.1:a '
e uurerenc
between the parties, all to no avail.
ti
1

Finally, in a hasty and last minute effort to clea h. , .
! l> dtSl
of pending matters before he retired from the ben h :
c , anG

over the strenuous objections of plaintiffs, Judge Sevy,
00
December 21, 1960, signed the Findings of Fact and Conr'.u
sions of Law and the Judgment and Decree which are tlic
subject matter of this appeal (R. 47-55). Then, too, on tilt
last day of the year, and, the last day of his tenure in offict
as District Judge, namely, December 31, 1960, he signed ilie
Order overruling and denying plaintiffs' Motion for Nrn
Trial (R. 58).

1

1

Because of its extreme importance to the rights of r!1t
parties, it should be noted that in spite of the numerous hear
ings which Judge Sevy held between the time of his writter. •
Decision dated April 15, 1947, and, his Judgment and Decrcr
dated December 21, 1960, which is the subject matter of d1ii
appeal, he nevertheless back-dated his decision thereby pur
portedly settling "all accounts existing between the plamtitl!
on one side and the defendants jointly on the side * *' .
up to and including the 24th day of April, 1946." Howeve:
he didn't settle any accounts between them since that dali
and December 21, 1960, and, he didn't decide the priman
question which was before him, namely, the question as.i•
. ms
· t ea d' that.' ~
the partition or sale of the property, ru1mg
1

.

.

· · · qwtaDk

light of developments smce the tnal of the case, it is me

6

I

f

·r , 0
·

,!l:( Ull J l

order a saie of the above-described property" (R.

)4·) 5).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COlJRT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATION OF
THE VARIOUS CREDITS TO BE ALLOWED THE PARTIES AND IN ALLOWING THEM 6% INTEREST
RATHER THAN 4% INTEREST ON CURRENT CONTRACT PAYMENTS AND 8% INTEREST ON DELIN-

QCENT CONTRACT PAYMENTS.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
~ 0 RULE ON THE PRIMARY QUESTION WHICH WAS
BEFORE THE COURT FOR DETERMINATION WHICH
1\'AS \\'HETHER THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE PARTITIONED OR ORDERED SOLD AND THE PROCEEDS
DIVIDED AMONG THE PARTIES.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION THAT THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE SOLD
llY RULING THIRTEEN AND ONE-HALF YEARS LATER
.\ND IN LIGHT OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE
TRL\ L THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND UNi /\IP. TO ORDER A SALE OF THE PROPERTY.

7

l

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATIOt-; Qi
THE VARIOUS CREDITS TO BE ALLOWED THE PM:
TIES AND IN ALLOWING THEM 6% INTEREil
RATHER THAN 4% INTEREST ON CURRENT CJ,,
TRACT PAYMENTS AND 8% INTEREST ON DELI~
QUENT CONTRACT PAYMENTS.

Judge Sevy's Judgment and Decree of December 1:.
1960, awards defendants judgment jointly against plaintL~i
for the sum of $293.25 with interest at 6% from April 2, ,
1946, until the date of the Judgment and Decree and gc,
thereafter, purportedly thereby settling all accounts betwec 2 '
the respective parties up to and including April 24, 1946 (R ·
54). A careful examination of the particular contract which i,
the subject matter of the law suit (Defendants' Exhibit l) :
and, the itemization of accounts in the Findings of Fact uron
which said Judgment is based (R. 51- 53), will dernonstrJt
1

conclusively that it is erroneous.
The itemization of credits as calculated by Judge Sen
allows plaintiffs total credits of $899.86 and defendants toral
credits of $3,583.87 (R. 52). The Judgment and Decree Sti'
forth that it settles accounts between the parties up to and
including April 24, 1946. Nevertheless, the last three items ,oi
credit allowed defendants are for items purportedly paid bi
defendants subsequent to April 24, 1946 (R. 52). Obvwuslr
to be consistent with the Judgment and Decree, these itemi
should have been eliminated.

8

Next, it will be noted from an examination of the contract

. 'f (Defendants' Exhibit 1) that the total contract price
.
1.:., sso.oo with $355.00 down and the balance of $3,195.00
\1 JS 'i"),
to be paid in forty ( 40) equal semi-annual installments, with
~c~ interest on all deferred payments. An abbreviated schedule
d the installment payments taken from the contract and
accruing between August 15, 1940, the date upon which the
record here shows defendants owed plaintiffs $119.89 (R. 49
m paragraph 4, and, R. 51, item 1), and, April 24, 1946, the
date up to which Judge Sevy in his Judgment and Decree
ruled that all accounts between the parties was settled, is as
1t;e1

follows:

Principal

Interest

Total

$79.88
79.88
79.88
7 9.88
79.88
79.88
79.88
79.88
79.88
79.88
79.88

$59.11
57.51
55.91
54.31
52.72
51.12
49.52
47.92
46.33
44.73
43.13

$138.99
137.39
135.79
134.19
132.60
131.00
129.40
127.80
126.21
124.61
123.01

When Due
Dec.
June
Dec.
June
Dec.
June
Dec.
June
Dec.
June
Dec.

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

1940
1941
1941
1942
1942
1943
1943
1944
1944
1945
1945

As indicated above, even before any additional installment
payment accrued, plaintiffs already had a credit against defendants amounting to the sum of $119.80.

The total installment payments accruing for the balance
of 1940 amounted to $138.99 of which plaintiffs' proportionate
share was 114 or $34. 75. That year plaintiffs actually paid
$!43.53 (R. 51) or $108.78 more than their proportionate

9

share.

The total installment payments accru

f

mg or 1
amounted to $273.18 of which plaintiffs' proportionate Ji
was

1,4

or $68.30. That year plaintiffs' actually pa·d
$,
1

(R. 51) or $67.34 more than

their

proportionate

b5u

The total installment payments for 1942 amounted to $ .,.
26
of which plaintiffs' proportionate share was 11
". _
14 0 r ,,(1(. ..
That year plaintiffs actually paid $70.73 (R. 51-52) or ~.J
more than their proportionate share.

The total installm'r

payments for 1943 amounted to $260.40 of which plainti;),
proportionate share was

1,4

or $65.10.

That year plaimih<

actually paid $66.24 (R. 52) or $1.14 more than theH fi'
portionate share. The total installment payments for 19i;
amounted to $254.01 of which plaintiffs' proportionate share
was

1,4

or $63.50. During 1944 plaintiffs did not make arn

payments on the contract installments. However, they hac
already accumulated considerable excess payments. As inJ 1
cated above, they already had credits against defendants srnc:
1940 amounting to $119.89 by virtue of a prior judgmtn
against them, which, with interest at 8% for four m:.
would at that time amount to $158.25.

Furthermore.ml~.

they made excess payments of $108.78; in 1941 thev m1Jt
excess payments of $67.34; in 1942 they made excess payment·
of $4.03; and, in 1943 they made excess payments of Sllor total excess payments up to that time of $339.54 B
off setting their proportionate share of the contract payment:
which they would owe for 1944 amounting to $63.50 aga1r)
the total excess payments made by them up to th

1
•·

amounting to $339.54, plaintiffs would still have mad: exce
payments of $276.04 prior to the contract payments wh:cli
accrued for 1945. The total installment payments for

10

$247.62 of which plaintiffs' proportionate share
e ·
_, .
$61.90 That year plaintiffs actually paid $124.61
, 1 a, u.-. or
1
• " • ct\ .)
$62.71 more than their proportionate share.
IR. )2i l 1
. t cl. ro

JfllOUcl

After 1945 no further contract installments became due
Jnd payable until June 1, 1946, a date subsequent to April
24 . l 94 6, the date up to which the Judgment and Decree of
. mbo" 'l 1 1960 purportedly· settled all accounts between
DeLe
\...L

........ ,

the parties.

'

.

As per the arithmetical calculations outlined

above p1aintffs had already fully paid their proportionate
If-: share of the contract installments and the excess payments
madt by them up to that time amounted to $276.04 plus
$62.71 or a total of $338.75. Any interest charges which
Judge Sevy allowed defendants in the itemization of credits
mthe Findings, (R. 51-52) if allowable at all, were allowable
)nly in favor of any defendant or defendants who may have
paid more than his or their proportionate share of the allocable
~osts aid against any defendant or defendants who may
1Gt have paid his or their proportionate share of the allocable
1ost~ but. certainly not against plaintiffs who had paid more
d1<1n theu proportionate share of the allocable costs.
Furthermore, when one or more of the defendants prepaid
and thus fully liquidated the contract by making payments
of $1,624.77 on July 11, 1945, and of $557.09 on March
26, 1946, (R. 52) the rights of plaintiffs or of the other
defendants could not be prejudiced thereby. Each of the
parties had a vested contract right to pay their 1,4 proportionate share of the remaining twenty-six (26) semi-annual
:ontract installments of $79.88 each with interest at 4%
~iiich would accrue after April 24, 1946, payable on each

11

June 1st and December 1st thereafter betwee J
n une 1,
and December, 1958. A prepayment on the cont t ' ;,,
.
rac cou1<l ;.
modify or abrogate the vested contract rights which .
1]t pa··
had. It could at most subrogate the party or part·
,' ··.·
1es Illd:c11
the prepayments to the right of the State Land B i ·
oara i1
receive the semi-annual payments as provided for by the
L

tract (Defendants' Exhibit 1).

It was error theret·-ure ;,
Judge Sevy to allow defendants credits of $1-624.n Jn:
$557.09 representing installment payments on the coni;,!,,
accruing after April 24, 1946. Also, as part and parcel ,
their vested contract nghts, the parties had the right tu

u

charged only 4% on the deferred contract balance until am
installment became due and 8% when it became de!inqurn
rather than the 6% which Judge Sevy erroneously chargtc
on all contract payments.

By signing the Judgment and Decree on December n
1960, and back-dating its effective date thirteen and one-lu!t '
( 131/2 ) years to April 14, 1946, the date up to which

accounts between the parties are purportedly settled, Jud:.
Sevy, without justification, greatly prejudiced the rights'
the parties. He purportedly settled many of the claims bet~e~

them. However, if his Judgment and Decree is allowed ·
stand, many of the claims which the parties had asserted D·
tween them and which arose between April 24, 1946, an ,
December 21, 1960, would more than likely be barred brr~.
statute of limitations.
The Judgment rendered by Judge Sevy agains'. · .ulii'i
based on the itemization of credits allowed defendants ;nd ,:,
interest charges assessed thereon is not sustainable in ia~·
in law.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING
TO RULE ON THE PRIMARY QUESTION WHICH WAS
nEFORE THE COURT FOR DETERMINATION WHICH
i:::\S WHETHER THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE PARTIi!ONED OR ORDERED SOLD AND THE PROCEEDS
DIVIDED AMONG THE PARTIES.
The law suit was brought primarily for the purpose of
partitioning certain farm and ranch property or having it sold
:nd then d1vidmg the proceeds among the parties. The Judgment and Decree of Judge Sevy dated December 21, 1960,

does neither. On April 15, 1947, in a written Decision he
ruled that "a sale thereof in bulk and as a whole is for the
best interests of all concerned" (R. 32-34). Thirteen and
one-half ( 131/2) years later and based on events subsequent
re the trial he ruled that "it is inequitable and unfair to order
a sale" (R. 53).

In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the
absolute right to partition yields to no consideration of hardshiF inconvenience or difficulty. Not only do the Utah Statutes
not prohibit partition of real property but they make specific
iliuwance for it and in the alternative provide for the sale
the property if partition cannot be made without great
prejudice to the owners. Section 78-39-1, Utah Code Annotated,
'9' '. provides as follows:

'.Jf

'When several co-tenants hold and are in possession
of rea_l property as joint tenants or tenants in common,
lll which one or more of them have an estate of inherit,,nc~. or for life or lives, or for years, an action may
be brought by one or more of such persons for a par-

13

.
tition thereof according to the respective · h
·
.
ng ts of··
persons interested therein,. a.nd for a sale of ~'
property or a part thereof, 1f 1t appears that
. .r
.h
.
a part1t1.;:
b
d
cannot e ma e wit out great preiudice to th .

5

-

e o11 ner..

In 7 3 A.LR. 2nd at page 7 38, it is said:
"We find the rule
. . to be, however, that in the a·bsence
f
o_ statutory -~rov1s~on to the contrary, the absolu·e

n~ht .to partlt~on yields. t~ no consideration of had. ·
ship, 1~convenience or diffKulty. Hill v. Reno, 112 IL
154; Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 201
pp 710-711; 68 CJS Partition § 48 and cases ther·

cited. Accordingly it is our view that this cause mci:
be remanded to the trial court for the entry of a derne ~
in c~~for~ity with our statute and appellant's right to /
partition.
'

See Peck v. Peck, 73 A.LR. 2d 723, 16 Ill. 2d 268, 157 NL ,.
2d 249.

I

Judge Sevy erred to the great prejudice of the parties r f
not deciding the very question which was before him whi:'.. '
was to partition the property or order it sold. The case shOL: i
therefore be reversed and remanded with directions that tt1'
issue be decided by the trial court.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING ITS ORJlT, ,l ,
DECISION THAT THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE SOL~ .
1

BY RULING THIRTEEN AND ONE-HALF YEARS LATEL
AND IN LIGHT OF EVENTS SUBSEQUE~T TO THf ,

14

TRIAL THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND UN;AIR TO ORDER A SALE OF THE PROPERTY.
As indicated m the argument under Point II, Judge Sevy

JngmaL'y ruled that a sale of the property was proper but
. sed hun·self later based on what he said were events sub'cver
)equent to the trial which made it inequitable and unfair
t,i crder a sale. He did not say whether the said property
could be partitioned or whether it would be "inequitable and
unfair" to do so. He ief t the parties hanging in mid air right

where they were before the suit was ever instituted.
This Court has ruled on numerous occasions that cases
cannot be based on matters outside the record. Nevertheless,
judge Sevy adjudicated the case before him for decision on
events after th:: trial. If such events were so prevailing it
would seem only logical and prudent to order a new trial so
that these events could be considered in making a decision.
This Judge Sevy failed and refused to do although a Motion
for New Trial was made for that very purpose.
In a partition suit the parties have an absolute right to

either have the property partitioned or sold. Judge Sevy's
Judgment and Decree does neither and unless reversed and
;emanded forces the parties to start all over again

CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of the applicable statute and the record
before
· l u d.mg the exhibits very demonstrably
. the Cour t me
points up the num erous preiu
· d.te1a
· 1 errors committed
·
by the

15

District Court. The case should therefore be reversed ~
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Attorney for Appellants
Suite 1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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